Summary
The surge in European purchases of American weapons marks a significant development in transatlantic defense relations, with substantial implications for EU-U.S. trade negotiations and European defense policy. Driven by heightened security concerns following the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and evolving geopolitical tensions, European nations have increasingly relied on U.S.-made military equipment to bolster their defense capabilities. This trend reflects both urgent rearmament needs and longstanding dependencies, despite the European Union’s parallel ambitions to strengthen its own defense industry and achieve greater strategic autonomy.
Key EU leaders, including European Council President António Costa, have acknowledged that the rising procurement of American weapons plays a critical role in rebalancing defense burden-sharing between Europe and the United States. This development has helped resolve major sticking points in trade discussions, thereby revitalizing prospects for a comprehensive EU-U.S. trade deal scheduled for completion before July 2025. At the same time, the European Commission’s ReArm Europe plan aims to increase intra-EU defense procurement and foster collaborative projects, while proposing a new military sales mechanism modeled on the U.S. system to improve defense industrial competitiveness within Europe.
Despite these efforts, European militaries remain heavily dependent on American technologies and platforms, such as the Patriot missile system and F-35 fighter jets, highlighting the complexity of reducing reliance on U.S. suppliers amid urgent security imperatives. The United States continues to dominate the global arms market, with record foreign military sales fueled by European demand, even as production bottlenecks and strategic considerations challenge timely deliveries. This dynamic underscores persistent tensions between European aspirations for strategic autonomy and the realities of transatlantic defense cooperation.
The evolving defense trade landscape has elicited varied reactions from stakeholders. U.S. defense industries express cautious optimism but voice concerns over EU policies that prioritize European suppliers, while European officials emphasize the need for improved joint procurement and industrial collaboration. Meanwhile, geopolitical uncertainties, internal European political divisions, and the pressures of aligning defense investments with broader trade goals contribute to ongoing challenges in harmonizing European strategic ambitions with transatlantic partnership. The surge in European purchases of American weapons thus remains a pivotal factor shaping both security and economic relations between the EU and the United States.
Background
In March 2025, key European Union figures, including European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and European Commissioner for Defense and Space Andrius Kubilius, addressed the future of European defense and the REARM Europe plan at the EU headquarters in Brussels, signaling the EU’s commitment to strengthening its defense capabilities and industrial base. This initiative comes amid ongoing efforts to enhance transatlantic defense cooperation and address tensions related to arms procurement policies between the United States and Europe.
The context of these developments is influenced by broader geopolitical and trade considerations. Former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa, echoing statements from then-U.S. President Donald Trump, described the military agreement as a significant achievement that rebalances defense burden-sharing between the United States and Europe. This agreement also ties into urgent trade negotiations, with the EU seeking to finalize a deal with Washington before impending U.S. tariff hikes scheduled for early July 2025.
Strategically, the European Commission envisions that by 2030, at least half of EU member states’ defense procurement budgets should be allocated to EU-based suppliers, rising to 60 percent by 2035. Furthermore, it aims for at least 40 percent of defense equipment to be procured collaboratively across member states. To achieve these goals, the Commission encourages identifying European defense projects of common interest, particularly in areas such as integrated air and missile defense, space domain awareness, cyber defense, and maritime protection. A new European military sales mechanism, inspired by the U.S. model, is proposed to facilitate these objectives.
Despite this inward-looking procurement strategy, the EU acknowledges that a substantial portion of its current military supply chain depends on U.S. defense contractors, indicating that a full transition to exclusively European suppliers would require significant adjustments. Moreover, the SAFE proposal for joint procurement extends opportunities beyond EU member states to include Ukraine, EFTA countries, candidate countries, and third countries engaged in security and defense partnerships with the EU, reflecting a broader collaborative approach.
Recent Developments
In recent years, there has been a significant surge in European purchases of American weapons, driven largely by heightened security concerns in the region and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. This trend has been marked by a sharp increase in arms imports by European countries, with the United States solidifying its position as the world’s leading arms supplier for the 23rd time in 25 years, accounting for 40 percent of global arms exports between 2018 and 2022. The influx of American military equipment into Europe is a direct response to the continent’s rearmament efforts, including a 94 percent rise in major arms imports by European powers, where Ukrainian imports have made the country Europe’s top arms importer.
EU leaders have welcomed the European Commission’s recent proposals to increase fiscal flexibility on defense spending, including plans to jointly borrow up to 150 billion euros to support military investments across member states. These financial measures coincide with NATO’s agreement to raise the defense spending target from 2 percent to 5 percent of GDP by 2035, a move designed to boost European military capabilities and harmonize defense efforts with U.S. strategic interests. The increased spending targets are expected to lead to greater procurement of American weaponry, helping to rebalance trade relations between Europe and the United States.
Despite ambitions for greater European strategic autonomy, Europe’s militaries continue to depend heavily on U.S.-made equipment. Nearly half of European fighter jets are American-made, and U.S. missile defense systems, such as the Patriot system produced by Raytheon, remain the most widely deployed on the continent. Countries like Poland have significantly expanded their arsenals with American systems, including M1A1 Abrams tanks procured under a $1.4 billion deal, alongside acquisitions from other non-European sources like South Korea. This trend underscores the complex challenge of reducing reliance on U.S. defense supplies amid urgent rearmament demands.
On the American side, the record high foreign military sales—reaching $100 billion in 2024—reflects the soaring demand from allies and partners, including European nations. However, U.S. defense contractors face production constraints due to cautious corporate investment strategies, despite expanding manufacturing shifts to meet urgent orders. The U.S. Defense Secretary has emphasized a commitment to expediting military sales to allies to ensure timely delivery of critical equipment.
Impact on EU-US Trade Deal Prospects
European Union Council President Antonio Costa has indicated that NATO’s agreement to more than double its defense spending target has effectively resolved the primary trade issue between the European Union and the United States. This development has paved the way for renewed momentum in negotiations toward a comprehensive trade deal between the two parties. Following the U.S. presentation of a new trade proposal to the European Commission, steps toward reaching an agreement have accelerated, with hopes that the EU and U.S. can finalize a deal ahead of the July deadline.
The increased defense spending and cooperation underpin a broader strategy to revitalize defense industrial capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic. This cooperation is seen not only as a means to enhance military strength but also as an opportunity to repair divisions among allies, fostering greater economic and security benefits. The surge in defense-related trade is reflected in the substantial increase in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) values, with the three-year rolling average for FY2022-FY2024 reaching $83.6 billion—a nearly 50% rise compared to the previous period.
For many European countries, procuring American defense equipment entails more than acquiring hardware; it involves deeper integration into U.S. military systems, including satellite intelligence, secure communications, and early warning capabilities, often described as “strategic enablers.” While this integration strengthens transatlantic security ties, it also carries inherent risks due to the global demand for American weapons and dependence on U.S. military-industrial infrastructure. Despite occasional European ambitions to reduce reliance on U.S. arms suppliers, many nations continue to emphasize the importance of reinforcing transatlantic relationships.
Stakeholder Responses and Positions
The surge in European purchases of American weapons has elicited a variety of responses from key stakeholders across the transatlantic defense landscape. U.S. defense firms and trade groups have expressed cautious optimism but also concern regarding evolving European policies aimed at bolstering indigenous defense industries. The Aerospace Industries Association, representing some 300 American companies, has urged Washington to resist EU strategies that prioritize European suppliers at the expense of U.S. firms, advocating instead for cooperative production agreements and stronger transatlantic ties.
European Commission initiatives to boost joint defense procurement and encourage member states to “spend better, work together, and prioritise European companies” have introduced new procurement frameworks that may effectively exclude non-EU countries, including the U.S. and the U.K., from certain defense contracts unless they enter into specific Security and Defence Partnership agreements with the EU. While the Commission maintains that non-EU companies can still compete for defense funds, in practice they face significant administrative and practical hurdles, complicating participation in EU defense programs.
From the U.S. side, there is an evident strategic calculus in maintaining and expanding arms exports as part of broader foreign policy objectives. American arms sales reached a record $318.7 billion in fiscal year 2024, a 29% increase from the previous year, fueled by heightened global demand amid geopolitical tensions and a European rearmament drive. This dominant position consolidates the U.S. as the world’s foremost arms supplier, a status underscored by the fact that American weapons accounted for 55% of European arms imports between 2019 and 2023, up from 35% in the previous five-year period.
Nevertheless, some within the U.S. national security establishment remain wary of the EU’s ambitions toward “European strategic autonomy,” viewing it as a potential transatlantic divide. The Trump administration notably opposed such moves, fearing they could lead to diminished U.S. influence in European security affairs. The Biden administration, while more engaged, has also pressed European nations toward tighter technological controls and trade measures to preserve transatlantic industrial collaboration, exemplified by the formation of the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council.
European defense officials acknowledge challenges in synchronizing software-intensive platforms like the F-35, which contains 24 million lines of code requiring constant updates, and in securing steady supplies of ammunition and spare parts for systems such as HIMARS and Patriots. The ongoing difficulties in replenishing stocks amid soaring demand further underscore the need for improved industrial cooperation and risk-sharing between the U.S. and European allies.
Finally, some smaller European states have refrained from commenting publicly on these developments, reflecting sensitivities around the balance between enhancing European defense capabilities and maintaining strong transatlantic security ties. The collective thrust remains focused on repairing the schism among allies through revitalized defense industrial cooperation, which promises economic and security benefits for both sides of the Atlantic while addressing pressing capability gaps.
Challenges and Criticisms
Efforts to increase European strategic autonomy and boost intra-European defense procurement face several significant challenges and criticisms. A central issue is the continued reliance of many European countries on American military equipment, which extends beyond hardware to include integration into U.S. strategic enablers such as satellite intelligence, secure communications, and early warning systems. While this reliance offers operational advantages, it also exposes Europe to risks associated with global demand for American arms and potential supply bottlenecks.
The U.S. defense industrial base is currently under strain, with major contractors like Lockheed Martin and RTX oversubscribed and production delays affecting key programs such as the F-35 fighter jet. These delays and increased costs create bottlenecks that disproportionately affect European buyers, who may find themselves at the back of the queue as the U.S. prioritizes its own strategic interests and the Indo-Pacific region. This situation complicates Europe’s efforts to maintain and modernize its defense capabilities while simultaneously reducing dependency on U.S. suppliers.
Another challenge stems from political divergences within Europe. The rise of populist and nationalist movements, exemplified by figures such as Simion, threatens the unity required for cohesive European defense initiatives. Such political currents may exacerbate divisions over key foreign policy issues, including the stance toward Russia and cooperation within NATO, undermining collective efforts to enhance European defense autonomy.
Moreover, some European actors express dissatisfaction with EU defense initiatives that appear to exclude key non-EU NATO members, notably the United States, from expanded defense industry cooperation. This exclusion fuels tensions and raises questions about the inclusiveness and feasibility of proposed European defense industrial strategies.
Despite ambitions to shift at least 50 percent of procurement budgets to EU-based suppliers by 2030 and promote collaborative defense projects across member states, Europe remains a significant exporter of military equipment globally, sharing about a quarter of the international arms trade. However, the U.S. continues to solidify its position as the world’s leading arms supplier, supported by surging exports amid renewed geopolitical tensions. This reality underscores the persistent dominance of American arms in European defense markets and complicates efforts to achieve greater European industrial self-sufficiency.
Finally, the broader geopolitical context, including uncertainties about the long-term reliability of U.S. security commitments and Russia’s revisionist behavior, further complicates Europe’s path toward strategic autonomy. The EU’s push to boost military spending and pool resources on joint projects is driven in part by concerns over a potential U.S. withdrawal or retrenchment from Europe, yet such ambitions must contend with entrenched dependencies and internal divisions.
In sum, Europe’s drive to increase defense procurement within its own industrial base and reduce reliance on American arms faces multifaceted challenges: production constraints in the U.S., political fragmentation within Europe, exclusion of key allies from collaborative projects, and the persistent predominance of the U.S. as an arms supplier. These issues highlight the complex balance between aspirations for strategic autonomy and the realities of existing defense relationships and capabilities.
Ongoing and Future Trade and Defense Negotiations
The ongoing trade and defense negotiations between the European Union (EU) and the United States are closely intertwined, with recent developments signaling significant shifts in both defense spending and procurement strategies. EU Council President António Costa emphasized that NATO’s agreement to more than double its defense spending target has resolved a major trade contention between the EU and the U.S., effectively rebalancing defense burden sharing and paving the way for improved trade relations. Costa highlighted that increased European purchases of American military equipment would help rebalance trade ties, reflecting longstanding U.S. priorities in the negotiations.
Despite this progress, negotiations have faced challenges, with reports indicating that talks reached an impasse halfway through a truce proposed by then U.S. President Donald Trump. Nonetheless, both parties are actively pursuing frameworks to facilitate cooperation. The European Commission unveiled the ReArm Europe plan, a strategic initiative aimed at boosting EU defense capabilities by mobilizing up to €800 billion in increased defense spending through new financial instruments, including €150 billion in loans designated for joint European defense investments. This plan complements the EU’s strategic vision that by 2030, at least 50 percent of member states’ defense procurement budgets should be allocated to EU-based suppliers, increasing to 60 percent by 2035, alongside targets for collaborative procurement to close capability gaps in areas such as missile defense, space domain awareness, and cyber defense.
In parallel, the EU is proposing a bold new European military sales mechanism inspired by the U.S. model, aimed at fostering intra-EU collaboration and strengthening defense industrial competitiveness. Joint procurement efforts under the SAFE proposal are designed to be inclusive, allowing participation not only by EU member states but also by associated and partner countries such as Ukraine and EFTA members, reflecting a broad security and defense partnership network. This inclusive approach seeks to enhance collective defense capabilities while facilitating interoperability with key allies, including the United States.
From the U.S. perspective, arms transfers and defense trade remain vital foreign policy tools with far-reaching implications. The U.S. employs a comprehensive, case-by-case review process governed by the Arms Export Control Act to ensure that transfers align with political, social, economic, and security considerations, as well as congressional oversight. Given the multiyear nature of defense trade cases, the Department of Defense provides rolling averages
Future Prospects and Trends
The future of European defense procurement is characterized by a complex interplay between efforts to increase strategic autonomy and the continued reliance on American weapons systems. While European Union (EU) member states are investing in developing indigenous capabilities and fostering intra-European collaboration, the United States remains a significant supplier and partner in the defense sector.
European ambitions for strategic autonomy include targets for 2030 and 2035, where at least 50 percent and 60 percent respectively of member states’ defense procurement budgets are expected to be allocated to EU-based suppliers. Additionally, the European Commission (EC) envisions that 40 percent of defense equipment acquisitions should be collaborative projects within the EU, aiming to fill capability gaps in areas such as integrated air and missile defense, space domain awareness, cyber defense, and maritime protection. To support this shift, the EC proposes a new European military sales mechanism inspired by the U.S. model, designed to streamline cross-border cooperation and procurement within Europe.
Despite these plans, European countries continue to face significant challenges in reducing dependency on U.S. defense technology. Over the 2020–2024 period, more than half of defense contracts signed by European NATO members were for European systems, but a substantial portion—34 percent—was still spent on U.S. systems. France remains a prominent European arms exporter, accounting for nearly 10 percent of global arms shipments, while Russia also maintains a notable presence as a weapons supplier to countries like India and China. The United States has historically pushed for increased European purchases of American weapons, a stance that has continued across multiple administrations, including recent messaging at security forums such as the Munich Security Conference.
Tensions exist between the European push for autonomy and the U.S. national security establishment’s concerns. The concept of “European strategic autonomy” has met with opposition from Washington, which views it as potentially leading to a weakening of transatlantic security ties. U.S. officials have expressed frustration with Europe’s perceived insufficient defense contributions and reliance on NATO, which remains largely under U.S. leadership. These dynamics highlight an ongoing debate over the balance between European defense independence and transatlantic cooperation.
Looking ahead, the EU’s defense procurement landscape is likely to be shaped by continued efforts to prioritize European suppliers and collaborative projects, alongside pragmatic recognition of the U.S.’s prominent role in the military supply chain. While obstacles remain for non-European manufacturers to compete for defense funds, particularly due to administrative and practical barriers, the growing defense budgets and procurement activities suggest a trend toward increased European investment in its own defense industry, albeit not yet fully decoupled from U.S. influence. The surge in European purchases of American weapons is thus expected to persist in the near term, potentially boosting transatlantic trade and strengthening defense trade deals, even as strategic autonomy remains an aspirational goal.
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